

## DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CHURCHLAND & FRANKFURT

### Frankfurt

- Free actions are those that result from effective second-order desires.
- Only first-order desires can be out-of-control. (That does *not* mean first-order desires are ever in-control. Frankfurt is not clear on that issue.) Second-order desires are, at least sometimes, in-control.
- “Being able to do otherwise” means “the capacity to have a different effective second-order desire that one identifies with the self”. (Moderate interpretation of freedom, origination, and intelligibility in [Table 1.1](#).)
- Some persons lack free will; other persons have free will. Free will =<sup>df</sup> effective second-order volitions/desires. (Frankfurt is not clear on what mechanisms are at work in determining when a second-order desire is effective or ineffective.)
- Frankfurt seems to claim that a person is either in-control (free) or out-of-control (not free) with respect to a given action.
- First and second-order desires are conscious.

### Churchland, Patricia

- Stop talking about “free will” and talk about degrees of self-control.
- Self-control is a matter of degree that can change over time in either direction.
- A person may be in-control with regard to one action but out-of-control with regard to another action. (Frankfurt would agree.)
- Some actions that seem completely in-control are actually the causal consequence of subconscious neural processing.
- The “self” as a unified, singular entity is an illusion caused by neural processing. (Frankfurt leaves “the self” unexamined.)
- Would agree with Frankfurt on the distinction between first and second-order desires. However, can say of both that the degree of self-control is a sliding scale.
- Second-order desires are effective or ineffective as a consequence of neural processing and physiological conditions.