
Neurophilosophy of Free Will
From Libertarian Illusions to a Concept of
Natural Autonomy

Henrik Walter

Translated from German by Cynthia Klohr

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Table 2.1
The Mind-Body Problem







Substance Dualism Clock Allegory	Substance Monism
<p>Parallelism Brain and mind are independent of each other, but synchronized. How are they synchronized?</p> <p>(a) Autonomism Synchronization is random. (No advocates)</p>  <p>(b) Occasionalism Synchronization is continually kept up and controlled by God. (Geulinx, Malebranche)</p>  <p>(b) Prestabilized Harmony Fixed by God for all time at the time of creation. (Leibniz)</p>  <p>Dualistic epiphenomenalism Brain controls mind without feedback.</p> 	<p>Neutral monism (double aspect theory) Mind and matter are merely different aspects of a single (unknown) substance. (Heraclitus, Spinoza, Schelling, Ostwald, Russell, Feigl)</p> <p>Spiritualism Everything is spirit. There is no matter. (Berkeley, Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Mach, Whitehead)</p> <p>Strict materialism Everything is matter. There is no spirit. (Hobbes, LaMettrie, Holbach, Vogt, Moleschott)</p> <p>Philosophical behaviorism Mental entities are behavioral dispositions. (Skinner, Ryle, Wittgenstein, Malcolm, Quine)</p> <p>Eliminative materialism There are no mental entities. Mental expressions will be replaced by neurophysiological terms. (Feyerabend, Rorty, Stich, Churchland)</p> <p>Monistic epiphenomenalism Mind is merely an epiphenomenon, (a reflection, a shadow, a secretion) of neural processes without causal feedback (Epicurus, Lucretius, Nietzsche, T. H. Huxley, Broad, Ayer)</p>

Table 2.1
Continued

Substance Dualism Clock Allegory	Substance Monism
<p>Animism Spirit animates all matter. (Plato, Plotinus, Augustine)</p> 	<p>Functionalism Mental states are functional states. <i>Hylemorphism</i> (Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, New-Thomism) <i>Machine functionalism</i> (Putnam, Fodor) <i>Teleofunctionalism</i> (Papineau, Millikan)</p>
<p>Interactionism Brain and mind are actively mutually effective. (Descartes, Penfield, Popper, Eccles, von Ditfurth)</p> 	<p>Identity theory Mental entities are identical with complex neuronal states and/or processes. <i>Type Identity Theory</i> (Place, Smart, Bunge, Vollmer) <i>Token Identity Theory</i> (Davidson, Kim) <i>Causal role IT</i> (Lewis)</p>
	<p>Nonreductive materialism Mental entities are always realized physically, but not reducible to physical entities. <i>Anomalous Monism</i> (Davidson) <i>Property Dualism</i> (Honderich, Chalmers) <i>New Emergence Theory</i> (Stephan)</p>

Various proposals and advocates of substance monism and dualism (taken from Vollmer 1986, p. 78, and modified). The clock allegory symbolizes the sort of causal mutual effects posited between mental and physical substance.